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STATEMENT OF CASE
This case comes before the Court after a trial following an appeal found in Hull v.
Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 331 P.3d 507 (2014).

The original appeal dealt with issues after the

Trial Court determined an oral contract existed and attempted to define the parties’ rights an
remedies thereunder. This Court relied on Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §204 (1981) in
its finding that when parties to a contract do not address an essential term to the contract, their
rights are determined by the court supplying terms reasonable in the circumstances. Id, at 520.
The most recent trial dealt with the costs to be charged to Appellant as development costs
and whether they were “reasonable” under the circumstances. Appellant objected to numerous
expenses being sought as reimbursable from the second phase of the development. Appellant
objected to these expenses as being inherently unreasonable when they included charges incurred
during the first phase of development. The Appellant had reached an agreement to be bought out
of the first phase of the development. Under that agreement, Respondent was required to pay all
the costs of development for the first phase in exchange for keeping all the profits. The initial 40
acre development was known as “Belmont/Emerald” and Respondent kept 100% of the profit in
exchange for supposedly paying “all the development costs.”
At the conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court made its rulings approving essentially all of
the expenses, including some admittedly incurred exclusively for the benefit of the original
Belmont/Emerald Subdivision even though the Appellant had no interest and would receive no
profit. Numerous other expenses or allocations were approved for reimbursement under the
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rational of “front loading” expenses which were admittedly the responsibility of a homeowners
association or were expenses of a privately owned water company in which Appellant held no
interest and would share no profit.
The current course of proceedings seek review of the Trial Court’s Order allowing
Respondent to recover development costs not associated with Phase 1.

They include recovery

of expenses, farming expenses, electrical upgrades, and water delivery charges which are the
contractual obligation of a homeowners association. Appellant is also seeking to reverse the
Trial Court’s evidentiary rulings in refusing to allow Appellant’s witness, Greg Ruddell, from
giving testimony as to “reasonable expenses” during the trial and allocate expenses to the various
subdivisions.
The Trial Court issued its original findings, made subsequent modifications and both
parties have sought to appeal various aspects of the Court’s decision, including allowing
recovery of expenses for costs incurred during the Belmont/Emerald phase in which the Court
had previously ruled were the exclusive responsibility of Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the latest trial, the parties attempted to resolve the issue of the appropriate amount to
be allocated for development costs which in turn would be utilized to determine the amount of
profit to be divided between the parties.

The costs of development going forward were to be

focused on the remaining 107 acres, and in particular, costs specifically associated within the
next phase known as “Triple Crown, Phase 1.”
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To determine the development costs, the Trial Court had to take into consideration that
the parties had initially agreed to resolve their interest in the first phase of the development
known as “Belmont/Emerald.”

Under a separate agreement, Appellant agreed to accept

$200,000 for his interest in that initial 40 acre phase. Respondent retained 100% of the profit
from that phase in exchange for the payment and the obligation to be responsible for all
Belmont/Emerald development costs.
In spite of the agreement and proration of profits for the Belmont/Emerald phase, the
Trial Court allowed numerous categories of expenses to be carried forward from the
Belmont/Emerald development as costs allocated to Triple Crown.

Moreover, the Trial Court

had also previously ruled that any costs associated with farming operations conducted by
Respondent pending complete development of the entire property, would be excluded from
development costs.

In spite of those prior rulings, the Trial Court has included in its decision,

reimbursement of costs attributable to expenses clearly incurred exclusively for farming
operations and from Belmont/Emerald expenses. Those costs appear in numerous categories
regarding expenses allowed for upgrading the irrigation system, electrical upgrades, operation of
a private water company and expenses incurred exclusively for farming.

There are also

expenses for lots locate din the Belmont/Emerald phase that were likewise included.

Similar

costs have been passed through to Appellant as development costs which have admittedly been
the legal obligation of a homeowners association for a water delivery system and for capital costs
of a private for profit corporation owned exclusively by Respondent.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the Court err in allowing development expenses, direct or indirect, paid

during the development of the first subdivision, Belmont and Emerald in 2006 and 2007, as well
as costs incurred prior to Giesler being ordered by the Court to perform the next phase and while
the land in Triple Crown Phase 1 was being farmed by Giesler?
B.

Did the Court err in allowing the expenses for the next subdivision, Triple Crown

Phase 1, after the parties had settled claims as to the first 40 acre subdivision, Belmont and
Emerald, where Gielser agreed to be responsible for all remaining costs?
C.

Did the Court err in finding that Giesler had met his burden of proof in

establishing the direct costs related to Triple Crown Phase 1, where farming costs were still
included as well as Belmont and Emerald costs for Belmont power undergrounds which were
included in Triple Crown Phase 1 development costs?
D.

Did the Court err in making Hull pay for one-half of the pressurized irrigation

system used to supply water to the entire 147 acre subdivision, when Giesler personally owns the
system, Triple Crown Water Company, uses it for farming, and contractually may charge the
Home Owners Association for its operation, management, repair, as well as recapture of capital?
E.

Did the Court err in not valuing the Nix lot at its fair market value when offset

against development cost rather than selling it to maximize net profit?
F.

Did the Court err by ordering Hull to share in net losses for lots added by Giesler

to the subdivision, the Holms lots and two Belmont lots, that were not part of the remaining 107
acres, and thus not subject to Hull’s interest in net profits?
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G.

Did the Court err by subjecting Hull to withstand any future loss when his interest

is limited to net profits?
H.

Did the Court err in ordering Hull to pay one-half of the accountant fees for

Giesler’s accountant, hired by the appointed Master, when said accountant acknowledged his
role was an advocate of Giesler?
I.

Did the Court err in allowing payment in the amount of $2,125 ordered by the

Master to be paid to Hull by Giesler be considered as a receipt of net profit, when in fact they
were reimbursement of actual costs paid by Hull?
J.

Did the Court err in not allowing Hull’s Motion for Summary Judgment, timely

noticed for hearing, to be denied without oral argument and thereby depriving Hull of an
opportunity to know in advance of trial what Giesler’s defenses were to the issues address?
K.

Did the Court err in refusing to allow Plaintiff’s lay and expert witness Greg

Ruddell to testify as to reasonable development costs.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Both the Trial Court and this Court have previously ruled that the parties have a
legitimate binding oral contract to split profits from the development of a 147 acre tract of
agricultural land into residential subdivisions. Consequently, the contract is commercial in
nature and would entitle Appellant to recover his attorney fees on appeal.
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Appellant therefor seeks recover of his attorney fees on appeal based on the fact that the
contract was a commercial transaction and as such is governed by Idaho Code §12-120(3). In
relevant part, the statute provides:
In any civil action . . . and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s
fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization,
the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
This Court has ruled that prevailing in a commercial transaction for purposes of the
award of attorney fees, includes proof that the commercial transaction occurred. O’Shea v. High
Mark Development, LLC, 153 Idaho 119, 280 P.3d 146 (2012).

Although the Respondent in

this case denied the existence of the contract between the parties, both the District Court and this
Court ruled that a commercial transaction was entered into by virtue of the profit sharing
agreement.
Idaho Code §12-120(3) provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil
action to recover on “any commercial transactions.” Commercial transactions are
all transactions except for personal or household purposes.
Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 329 P.3d 368, 380 (2014).
The focus on the question of attorney fees or who is the prevailing party, shouldn’t be on
whether development costs were allowed, but rather, whether the costs sought were reasonable
under the circumstances.
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Appellant seeks recovery of his attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule
35(a)(5)(b)(5) and Idaho Appellate Rule 41.

ARGUMENT
1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Rulings by the Trial Court’s refusing to admit evidence or allow testimony are reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard. Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 299 P.3d 781 (2013).
When reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of
discretion standard. Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 871, 136, P.3d 338, 342
(2006). These include trial court decisions admitting or excluding expert witness
testimony, and excluding evidence on the basis that it is more prejudicial than
probative. Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50-51, 995 P.2d
816, 820-21 (2000)
Id. at 786.
To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court considers
whether the district court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the outer boundaries of that discretion consistent with applicable legal
standards; and (3) reached its decision through the exercise of reason
Hansen v. Roberts, Supra cited at Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 367 P.3d 1214 (2016);
See also, Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 676, 378 P.3d 464 (2016); Mattox v. Life Care Centers of
America, Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 473, 337 P.3d 672, 632 (2014) (quoting McDaniel v. Inland
Northwest Renal Care Group Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221-22, 159 P.3d 856, 858-59 (2007)
On the issue of the question of the reasonableness of the expenses which were ultimately
allowed by the Court, that is a question of law. Since the Trial Court was supplying a missing
contract term, that issue is a legal question over which the reviewing court exercises free review.
Questions of law decided at the lower court are reviewed freely by the appellate court.
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Questions of law are reviewed by the appellate court directly. Sacred Heart Medical Center v.
Nez Perce County, 136 Idaho 448, 35 P.3d 265 (2001); Friel v. Boise City Housing Authority,
126 Idaho 484, 887 P.2d 29 (1994); and Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 494, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282
(2001) (Stuart IV).
However, it does rise to an abuse of discretion level when the Trial Court refuses to allow
a party to submit evidence as to cost allocations which in this case concern direct evidence as to
the reasonableness of expenses incurred in a residential subdivision.
“As to questions of law, this court exercises free review.”
Id. at 494-95 – 36 P.3d at 1282, 1283. See also, Hoagland v. Ada County,154 Idaho 900, 906,
303 P.3d 587, 593 (2003) and Sky Canyon Properties v. Golf Club, 159 Idaho 162, 357 P.3d
1270 (2015)
2.

INTRODUCTION.
The issues on appeal center around two primary issues; the first being the Court’s “legal

interpretation” of what development costs should be allowed as being “reasonable under the
circumstances,” since the parties did not define that term in their oral profit sharing contract.
The first assignment of error, therefor, seeks review of this Court’s legal conclusions as to what
development costs were “reasonable under the circumstances.”
The second issue concerns the Trial Court’s rulings on evidentiary matters disallowing
expert testimony to present evidence as to what would constitute reasonable development costs
or to allow Appellant’s expert witness to testify as to the allocation of various expenses which
were supposed to be limited to costs directly associated with the Triple Crown Phase 1 parcel
only.
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The development costs issue is complicated by the fact that the same parties reached an
agreement on their profit sharing interest for the first phase of development known as
Belmont/Emerald. Under that agreement the Appellant waived his rights to share in net profits
in exchange for a single cash payment of $200,000. However, as part of that agreement,
Respondent was to pay the development costs for the Belmont/Emerald phase.
The second and most recent trial was focused exclusively on determining what were the
appropriate amount of development costs for Triple Crown Phase 1 development.

The issue,

therefore, wasn’t whether there were development costs, but what was the appropriate amount of
development costs for the next phase of development.
During the trial, the Trial Court allowed numerous categories of expenses to be recouped
or charged against the Appellant although the Trial Court denied the Appellant’s expert, Greg
Ruddell, to offer testimony regarding the reasonableness of expenses being charged by
Respondent.
The Appellant seeks review of the Trial Court’s rulings as to the allowance of certain
development costs. The parties’ oral profit sharing contract did not address what development
costs were allowable.

This Brief will examine the Trial Court’s findings in the record to see

whether there is sufficient evidence to support the Trial Court’s ruling or make a finding that the
conclusions were clearly erroneous.
The dispute at trial and which continues through this appeal process, is the
reasonableness of expenses associated with the Triple Crown phase of development when there
is an absence of a contractual term defining such expenses.
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During the trial, the Trial Court acknowledged its obligation to supply or define the
missing term of the contract by allocating the development expenses to Phase 1, also referred to
as “Triple Crown.”

In an exchange with Respondent’s counsel, the Court made the following

query which illustrates the confusion with its role in determining what expenses were reasonable:
THE COURT:
Well, what should I do? I mean, there’s no agreement
between these parties other than that Mr. Hull got bought out of Belmont for
$200,000 for his interest. But I can’t find anything in this record that shows an
agreement between these parties as to how to allocate anything. So I’m left with
the situation of sitting here making it up as I go, and that’s – I’m not sure that’s
what the Court should be doing, but if I don’t do that, we’ll never get this case
resolved. I mean, do you agree that I have the inherent equitable power in this
case to make a decision that would supply the terms, if you will, supply, I don’t
want to say terms, because that sounds like a contract, but to make those
allocation decisions based on equity?
MR. WRIGHT: I do. I don’t know how else you can do it.
Tr., p. 522/523, L. 21 - 10.
The Court further expressed frustration over determining or allocating costs associated
with a ditch removal expense:
THE COURT: Well, and that is – that’s again the essence of the problem here
because I think the testimony is undisputed that the majority of that ditch went
through phase 1. That there would a tail end of it in the blue part, phase 2,
correct?
MR. WRIGHT: Right.
THE COURT: So – and you take the position from the start of this trial that I
should not be making decisions about how much debt should be, development
cost should be related to anything but phase 1. How do I, on this record, make a
proportional determination of, assuming that I decide that’s reasonable to take the
ditch out, and we have whatever debt we have, how do I decide that based upon
this record because nobody testified as to footage, percentage or anything. I can’t
just make that up. What do I do?
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Tr., p. 527, L. 10 - 24.
The Trial Court then actively solicited input from Respondent’s counsel as to what would
be the proper allocation of certain costs:
THE COURT: What you’re suggesting is that as to things like, well, everything
that has happened at this point for demolition, cleanup, the Thorpe bill, the Nix
bills, the ditch, even though some of that relates to the property on phase 2, I
essentially should front load that at this time and adjust that in the sale of the acres
– the lots in phase 1. Is that what you’re saying?
Tr., p. 529, L. 11-17
The follow-up response by Respondent’s counsel further illustrates the confusion associated with
the allocation of development costs:
MR. WRIGHT: Yes. And there isn’t, you know, any costs, we have presented,
yeah, there’s a lot of costs already in phase 2 that are specific to that that have
nothing to do with phase 1, but these costs that are related to phase 1, they’re kind
of related to both, let’s put them in 1 so we don’t kind of always have that friction
of what gets put forward, what doesn’t.
Tr., p. 529, L. 18-24.
The Trial Court then recognized its own dilemma in supplying a practical definition of
development costs as a reasonable contract term when the Court answered its own question this
way:
THE COURT: Why would that be fair and equitable to Mr. Hull? Because he
certainly is not going to get the benefit of lot sales in phase 2 for a period of time;
your client would be getting reimbursed up front. That’s kind of contrary to the
concept of a pro rata allocation of development costs, isn’t it?
Tr., p. 529/530, L. 25 – 5.
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In spite of this exchange and the obvious recognition of burdening the Appellant with
costs not associated with the specific development before it, the Trial Court went forward and
made two separate rulings allowing “front loading” of development costs from Phase 2 into
Phase 1.
More problematic are the costs which the Trial Court carried forward from the original
Belmont/Emerald Subdivision as allowable expenses to Triple Crown Phase 1. The Trial Court
allowed innumerable expenses incurred in 2006-2007 from Belmont/Emerald even though the
Trial Court had stated that Respondent Giesler was solely responsible for development costs
from the Belmont/Emerald phase of the subdivision. In its rulings allowing the carry forward of
expenses, the Trial Court did exactly what it warned would be unfair to Appellant as quoted in
the above exchange.
Numerous other examples exist of expenses which the Trial Court allowed Respondent to
carry into the Triple Crown development; costs that although they were clearly incurred either
for the earlier development of Belmont/Emerald or were costs that were being “front loaded”
from Phase 2 were allowed as Triple Crown costs.

In the most egregious circumstances,

expenses were charged to Appellant for irrigation farming expenses and water system upgrades
that were legally the contractual obligation of the homeowners association or the privately
owned water company, neither of which Appellant has any interest.
3.

LEGAL AUTHORITY.
The Trial Court would have benefited from a review of this Court’s prior rulings on how

to define omitted contract terms.

APPELLANT’S BRIEF – Page 12

This Court’s ruling in Star Phoenix Mining Co. v. Hecla

Mining Co., 130 Idaho 223, 939 P.2d 542 (1997), stated general principals regarding omitted
terms in commercial contracts:
It is well settled that a contract includes not only what is stated expressly but also
that which of necessity is implied from its language.
Citing Lane v. Pacific and Idaho Northern Railroad Company, 8 Idaho 230, 67 P.656 (1902),
and Long v. Owen, 21 Idaho 243, 121 P.99 (1912). Referencing Commercial Insurance Co. v.
Hartwell Excavating Co., 89 Idaho 531, 407 P.2d 312 (1965);.Id. at 541.
The Court went on to cite as its formulation of the above rule, Davis v. Professional
Business Services, 109 Idaho 810, 712 P.2d 511 (1985) where it stated:
In every contract there exist not only the express promises set forth in the contract
but all such implied provisions as are necessary to effectuate the intention of the
parties, and as arise from the specific circumstances under which the contract was
made. In implying terms to a contract that is silent on the particular matter in
question, only reasonable terms should be implied. Such implied terms are as
much a part of the contract as those which are expressed.
Id. at 813-14, 712 P.2d at 514-15(emphasis in original)
Applying the above formula, it is evident that the Idaho Supreme Court has strived to
apply reasonable and prudent terms to missing vital contract provisions which have not been
provided for.

To do so one must be mindful of the subject matter of the contract. In this case

the subject is residential development costs which the Trial Court attempted to resolve in a
vacuum without input or testimony of what are reasonable expenses based on other
developments.
The concept of applying reasonable terms of omitted but essential contract term was but
one of the crucial findings by this Court in the original appeal:
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. . . when parties to a contract have not agreed to a term essential to determine
their rights and duties, the court supplies a term reasonable in the circumstances.
Hull vs. Giesler, Id., at 520 citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §204 (1981). See also, In
Re: Davis, 554 B.R. 918 – Bankr. Court, D. Idaho, 2016; and Kantor v. Kantor, 160 Idaho
812, 379 P.3d 1080 (2016):
The question before the Trial Court at the most recent trial was the reasonableness of
development expenses charged by Respondent.

However, from the above-quoted Supreme

Court decisions, what is “reasonable” are to be defined by the circumstances of the case. There
is no dispute that this is a case about the development of a residential subdivision property to be
developed over a period of years.

The costs of development the Trial Court was charged with

finding were to be reasonable under the circumstances. How else could reasonable development
costs be determined than through comparison with independent information as to reasonable
development costs and allocating costs incurred for this specific phase only? That was the
question presented to Judge Stoker by the Appellant and attempted to be answered by his
witness, Greg Ruddell.
At trial Mr. Ruddell was asked to allocate the costs presented by Respondent and identify
those which were not associated with Triple Crown. Mr. Ruddell was introduced as a real estate
consultant. See, Tr., p. 469.
When counsel attempted to illicit testimony from Mr. Ruddell as to the allocation of
charges used by Respondent for reimbursement, the Court refused to allow Mr. Ruddell to
provide testimony and sustained objections See, Tr., p. 474-477 and 480-485.
The Trial Court went further and stated:
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THE COURT: There’s no agreement that any of those costs have to be applied
to phase 1, phase 2, phase 5. You’re all just assuming things. Because I heard no
testimony from anybody that Mr. Hull and Mr. Giesler reached any agreement on
anything about this. It’s all speculation. And all we’re doing is just – we’re
arguing theory here. We’re not arguing facts. I just don’t find this testimony
helpful at all.
Tr., p. 484/485, L. 24-5.
Based on the Trial Court’s stated intent to continue sustaining objections Mr. Ruddell’s
exhibit on cost allocations, Appellant was unable to present evidence as to the reasonableness of
expenses being charged. This is deeply troublesome given the fact that this was not a jury trial,
but rather a bench trial. The Trial Court certainly had the knowledge and ability to weight the
evidence for probative value.

It is also noteworthy that the Ruddell exhibits were essentially

compilations of information provided through discovery by Respondent and his accountant who
was, by the way, allowed to testify as to his conclusions of reasonableness as to the
recoverability of all of the expenses.
In Appellant’s counsels’ attempt to obtain approval for the introduction of the testimony
and exhibits of Mr. Ruddell, the following exchange occurred:
MR. EDSON: Your Honor, I believe that all the exhibits in Exhibit 2 reference
an analysis of Mr. Hayes’ calculations as well as the – his testimony that he had
reviewed the summaries prepared by Mr. Hayes.
Tr., p. 494, L. 12-15.
In spite of such explanations, the Trial Court sustained the objections even though Mr.
Ruddell had been identified in discovery as an expert witness and no Motion in Limine was filed
to restrict his testimony. He did, however, respond to the Court’s questioning that his analysis
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was to review the exhibits prepared by Respondent’s accountant who compiled the expense
summaries.
Numerous other expenses were approved by the Trial Court in spite of testimony that the
invoices for those items were used exclusively for farm irrigation purposes.

See, Tr., p. 504-

505.
The Appellant was denied the ability to present evidence or live testimony concerning the
reasonableness and allocation of costs which the Trial Court ultimately allowed as reimbursable
costs to Triple Crown, Phase 1. The lack of a specific contract identifying which should be
allocated as a reasonable development cost was then left to the Trial Court’s determination.
In spite of the lack of direct testimony from a witness, namely, Greg Ruddell, the Trial
Court could have and should have entertained lay or expert testimony as to the reasonableness of
development costs based on other subdivision development costs.

That is exactly what Mr.

Ruddell attempted to testify to in his initial testimony that he had consulted Marshall & Swift’s
cost evaluation book to establish subdivision costs generally. See Tr., p. 475, L. 3-7.
The Trial Court’s original Memorandum Opinion from July, 2016 Trial dated August 4,
2016 and the Trial Court’s Supplemental Memorandum Opinion Regarding the July, 2016 Trial,
both incorporate the concept of “front loading” expenses to Phase 1. Nothing in the agreement
between the parties addressed front loading expenses. Moreover, the authorities cited above
dealing with implied terms defining what would be reasonable under the circumstances, never
allowed front loading costs. The net affect is to require Appellant to pay for expenses on
property yet to be developed or even offered for sale.
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The Trial Court also allowed as recoupable expenses, charges which Appellant had never
seen either in discovery or at the time of trial. The Trial Court went even further and ruled that
unless Appellant objected to such expenses within ten days, the Trial Court was going to deem
those expenses allowed without proof as to “reasonableness.” See, Supplemental Memorandum,
p. 2-3.

In addition, the original Memorandum Opinion, page 3, allowed the recoupment

of expenses which were carried forward from the Belmont/Emerald development expenses.
Those findings were clearly in error.
The issue at trial was not whether Respondent was entitled to any development costs.
Rather, whether the development costs were unreasonable and excessive under the
circumstances. This is especially poignant given that the Trial Court excluded testimony and
evidence as to reasonable development costs under the circumstances for residential
developments in the Twin Falls County area.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reject the Trial Court’s findings on the basis that they are premised on
information which erroneously included expenses from earlier subdivisions, expenses from
subdivision properties yet to be developed and charges for expenses for a privately owned water
company conducting farming operations, none of which have a direct correlation or benefit to
Phase 1 or the Appellant’s right to net profits.

By excluding testimony and evidence as to

reasonable development costs, the Trial Court could not develop an adequate record to determine
development costs that were reasonable.
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By taking a myopic view and looking exclusively at

costs presented by Respondent, the Trial Court was unable to determine what are reasonable
expenses in the circumstances.

Since it limited the evidence to a single source, this Court

should overturn the ruling of the Trial Court and award attorney fees to Appellant on appeal.
Dated this 21st day of June, 2017
GERY W. EDSON, P.A.,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of June, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to the following parties by the method(s) indicated below:
Andrew B. Wright
WRIGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, PLLC
1440 Blue Lakes Blvd. N.
P.O. Box 5678
Twin Falls, ID 83303-5678
Email: AWri ht Wri htBtQj:her Law.cgm
Facsimile: (208) 733-1669

Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants

l:8J U.S. Mail D Overnight Mail D Facsimile l:8J E-Mail Attachment D Hand Delivery

ByGery~1fl

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 18

